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Amos E. Simpson
University of Arkansas
The intensive preoccupation with the economic as-
pects of war preparation and warfare which was a part
of the Nazi rule resulted ina large literary output
on the subject in the years after 1933 -i/ Histori-
cally there has been a distinction between war eco-
nomics and the economics of peace, but this disjunc-
tion was abandoned in National Socialist Germany.
The economics of both war and peace were unified in
the new Wehrwirtschaft, or preparedness economy. -'
This extensive literature was given prominence inboth
financial and political presses, as well as in mili-
tary periodicals. A whole new type of writer with a
combination of economic and military training de-
veloped. Some of these were relatively objective in
their approach, but they never arrived at the exact
meaning of the term even for themselves.^/ They dis-
cussed the problems of Germany in the fields of re-
armament and economics thoroughly, while at the same
time following the economic measures adopted inother
countries, particularly those engaged in war at the
time, such as Japan, China, and Spain. k/
While there was little agreement among the German
writers en the subject of Wehrwirtschaft, three major
groupings may be distinguished. Some of the experts
tended more or less to ignore the whole idea. They
preferred the old concept of peace economy and war
economy as two distinct policies and regarded economic
preparedness as a policy which would prevent another
situation such as Germany suffered at the beginning
of the first World War, when she was forced into hasty
improvisation after the crisis began. i/Other writers
attempted to surround a number of definite administra-
tive functions and policies, such as self-sufficiency,
government control of important industries, price
88
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 11
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956
WEHRWIRTSCHAFT: AN ASPECT OF NAZI ECONOMIC THEORY
89
and currency control, and labor regulation, with some
indefinable classification, and call the sum total
Wehrwirtschaft .-/ A third group, and certainly the
most important, viewed such measures as permanent,
and not as temporary expedients to be discarded when
the danger of crisis was past. These writers either
identified Wehrwirtschaft with the national economy
as such during a prolonged state of preparedness or
more generally conceived it as the guiding ideology
of present -day economic policy in peace as well as
in war.-^/ In short, Wehrwirtschaft was an economic
philosophy in the srme way that capitalism and socia-
lism were economic philosophies. In this viewitwas
impossible to describe it b3' using specific measures
or institutions, no matter how well defined, but by
recognizing tho new Wirtschaf tgesirinung ,or economic
philosophy, which characterized Itjj/
As a science VJehrwirt schaf t needed a theory, but
those who interested themselves in the problem re-
fused to build it up from abstract ideas. They at-
tempted t o take the factual material from both the
past and present, mold it into a theory, and use it
to draw conclusions for the future.--/ Before 1938
one could not find the word Wehrwirtschaft ina dic-
tionary or encyclopedia., although itran riot in the
newspaper3 and periodicals even in foreign languages.
=2/ To define the word by a logical approach did not
satisfy any of its proponents. They usually began
with some amorphous definition which regarded Wehr-
wirtschaft as "the laws of living and the necessities
of life of a nation giving direction to its economy."
=i/ Then the argument was developed: inherent in the
definition of a "nation" is the idea of defense. A
nation which cannot defend itself is not truly a na-
tion. The national economy therefore, must perforce
always be a Wehrwlrt aohaft. Like the army, the econ-
omy must deliver the arias,, and the army is expected
to secure the nation and "'•he economy. Peace economy
is either a Wehrwisrtschaft or else itis not a real
89
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National economy, for it bears the same relation to
the nation as a standing army.i^/
There was an indissoluble link between the whole
concept of Wehrwirtschaft and German military, dip-
lomatic, and propaganda strategy. In fact, one author
went so far as to insist that the adjective wehr
should be prefixed to all great fields of national
life,and specif icallynamed economics, science, phil-
osophy, psychology, geography, sociology, ethics,
technique, finance, law, and even religion.±2/ Some
of the military officers writing on economic problems
stressed repeatedly the intellectual or spiritual
character of Wehrwirtschaft , which they thought should
be a general leading principle of national policy
rather than a series of concrete administrative mea-
sures. ±2/ This point of view defined Uehrwirtschaft
as "a willand endeavor which aims at superiority over
the enemy in a future war in the economic field and
by economic methods."^/ Other leading military wri-
ters were chiefly interested in the social implica-
tions of a modern war economy. One of them wrote
that "Wehrwirtschaft is often identified with the
national economy as such. . . . The economy must be
equally fit for defense inpeace and in war; the eco-
nomic ideas must correspond to the military ideas,
although Wehrwirtschaft need not necessarily be di-
rected toward an actual war."i2/ On the other hand,
some of the military writers believed that Wehrwirtr-
schaft was to ''prepare the economy in peacetime in
such a way that the production of material important
for warfare could start at the decisive moment quickly
and in sufficient quantities. "=2/ Despite such ten-
dencies to argue the question of its meaning with
reference to an actual war, the usual attitude was
that there was to be no essential difference in the
economy in war and peace. It3/ One of the most suc-
cinct expressions of the identity of the economy of
war and that of peace was that of Benito Mussolini
when he stated that:
90
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the distinction between a war and peace economy
is simply absurd. There is no such thing as
an economy of peace-time and an economy of war-
time. There is only a war economy because,
historically, on the basis of the number of
years of war, it is proved that the state of
armed warfare is the normal stage of the peoples,
at least of those living on the European con-
tinent, and because even in the years of so-
called peace other forms of warfare are prac-
tised which in turn prepare for armed war-
fare.12/
It is impossible define Wehrwirtschaft without
first examining the internal connections between
government and policy on one hand and form of economy
on the other. Further, one must investigate the con-
nection between the military and the economy. In an
authoritarian government the economy is not only a
servant to the nation, but also an instrument of war
in an aggressive and defensive sense. £2/ There is a
further aspect of Wehrwirtschaft aid that is the close
relation between the formation of the reality of the
new system and what one writer called the "new self
consciousness of the nation." He seems to have some
nebulous idea of this economic practice having stemmed
from an attitude of mind found only in the German
people and there only because of their peculiar ex-
periences.^/ Another writer expressed much of the
same concept: "We see in Wehrwirtschaft one expres-
sion of our national and vfllkischen Will and one of
the most important weapons of war. This weapon can
be used not only for defense, as in the first World
War, but also as a forceful weapon of attack. "==/
The result of all this is that Wehrwirtschaft is a
form of economy "in which all precautions are made
to preserve the self maintenance of a nation by eco-
nomic means against danger from external forces by
means of economic pressure, sanctions, blockage, and
war. "23/
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It is impossible to provide a cut and dried sum-
ming up of the term Wehrwirtschaft for there is no
adequate English translation for it. Even prolonged
investigations by German experts and writers have
failed in the attempt to arrive at a definition per
se. Only through discussion of its fuller implica-
tions can one draw his own conclusions and interpre-
tations. Albert T. Lauterbach, who has made an in-
tensive study of preparedness economy, sees two major
characteristics which appear more or less constant:
(l) It was to be a new economic system, or
principle, and not merely an emergency provi-
sion to be abolished when the state of emer-
gency disappeared. (2) Its method consisted
of a virtual shift to a preparedness or war
economy during peacetime. The purpose was a
peacetime revision of the whole social and eco-
nomic structure in such a way that full effi-
ciency could be achieved at the very moment
that war entered the military phase. 2±I
The most extreme view was that in reality peace is
also a form of self-preservation like war. In other
words, the same forces used in wartime for self-
preservation must be used in peacetime for the same
reasons. 25/
Wehrwirtschaft is far reaching inits implications.
Itbecomes hopelessly entangled in and inseparable
from such ideas as war and peace economy; socialism
and capitalism; self-sufficiency and autarky. The
proponents of autarky readily accepted the philosophy
of Wehrwirtschaft .^2/ To a majority of the writers
in the field, the impossibility of importing food and
raw materials during a war was the most important
single factor in the new ideas. isZ/ The thinking <£
all Germans was colored by an outstanding example of
economic unpreparedness which they had personally ex-
perienced. The blockage of Germany during the first
92
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World War was responsible for the inability to im-
port food and raw materials and produced a desperate
situation there. The conditions produced by the
blockade were blamed as providing one of the major
reasons for the defeat of the German nation, and more
than a few economists and writers have attributed
Germany's autarkic attitudes to that disaster.
Germany's fate was decisively altered by the
blockade, which now forced her into an invol-
untary and inexorable autarky, although up to
that time she had participated in world trade
more than any other nation except England. This
experience has never faded from the memory of
the German people. Without it the economic
policy of the Hitler regime cannot be under-
stood.2§/
Some writers even went so far as to say that the
most important effect of war is the cutting off of
international trade, pointing out that what is an ad-
vantage in peacetime planning may become a positive
disadvantage inwar. Colonies, for example, and fish-
ing rights can be extremely useful if planning is for
peacetime only, but they lend a false sense of se-
curity because they are the first losses when war
eventuates. Whereas they contribute in peacetime to
political and economic independence, they are but
destroyed reserves in war.^2/
In every economy, whether war or peace, labor,
capital, and natural resources must be kept in the
best possible balance. This balance is easiest kept
in larger mineral areas and for that reason nations
seek colonies. But a nation is absolutely sovereign
only within its own borders, and in case of war the
traffic with colonies is interrupted. Then the eco-
nomic borders become identical to the political bor-
ders and even if needed materials are available in
distant colonies they cannot be used because of the
cutting of sea lanes by blockade. 22/
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The first World War provided the first example of
the idea of total war, which has been defined as "a
war conducted in three dimensions of one nation a-
gainst the other with all the psychic and physical
and material forces. "31/ The military economists
wanted to use the experience gained from it to im-
prove the German position internationally and to as-
sure the inability of any enemy ever again to win a
military victory over Germany. Major General Georg
Thomas, Chief of the Wehwirtschaftsstab in the High
Command of the army wrote that "the wrong idea of a
short war has already been our ruin once, and there-
fore we should not let ourselves be guided by the
dream of a short war even in this age of tank-divisions
and aircraft squadrons . "32/ jn a discussion of the
three factors on which the development of military
economics was based, he wrote "the first factor is
the exploitation of the experiences gained during the
World War. "22/
According to the Nazi economists, however, their
predecessors failed to make use of the war experi-
ences ina peace economy. The policy bosses and eco-
nomic leaders of the Weimar Republic wanted to start
again from where they stopped in 1914. The State was
not to lead the economy, but economy was to lead the
State. The proponents of Wehrvdrtschaft, on the other
hand, insisted that the economy had to be the servant
of the State, not only for social- ethical reasons,
but also because itmust be an adjunct of the armed
forces of the nation. 34/ "The main goal of the Ger-
man economy was to build up a system which safe-guarded
German existence even in war under all circumstan-
ces. "25/
The obvious lesson to be learned from the experi-
ence of the first World War was that Germany must be
self-sufficient in the event of another conflagra-
tion.22/ "Every step to autarky helps the liberty of
our nation. We know we cannot live on an island, but
liberty and security of our nation demand that we
94
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aspire to itat all costs. "2Z/
The idea of autarky was not new by any means, nor
was it confined to the Germans. Economists and com-
mentators of practically every nation discussed the
problem, and many publications suggested some form
of autarky for each nation.^/ P. T. Ellsworth, in
his volume on International Economics, wrote that
"the appeal of self-sufficiency, however, is not lim-
ited to nations dominated by military ideology. The
fear of war makes economic independence seem desir-
able to many in countries where pacifist sentiment
is strong. ''29/ Certainly not all Germans favored
autarky, =2/ but gradually the thinking of the National
Socialists turned toward acceptance of the necessity
of absolute self-sufficiency, and that idea along
with the concept of Wehrwirtschaft was consummated
in the Four Year Plan which has been termed "the
greatest economic effort of a military character un-
dertaken outside Russia. "42/
Hitler proclaimed the Four Year Plan to secure
German life before the Nuremberg Party Congress on
September 9, 1936, saying that itwas designed to make
Germany "wholly independent of other countries in all
those materials which German capacity, our chemistry,
our machine industry, and our mining industry can pro-
duce at home. "42/
On October 18, Hermann Gtfring was appointed Pleni-
potentiary for the Four Year Plan with the task of
putting the entire economy in a state of readiness
for war within four years. kl/ Hitler's action meant
that the policies which had been followed to 1936
were to be dropped in favor of the complete control
over economics by the Four Year Plan, the vehicle of
Wehrwirtschaft and autarky. 4V From 1936 until the
beginning of Allied victory during World War II,the
Four Year Plan under GWring dominated every aspect
of the economic lifeof the nation. Despite the fact
that private ownership was retained in Germany, the
degree of freedom of individual owners in directing
95
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their own organizations and capital rapidly was cur-
tailed. The National Socialist idea of private owner-
ship was that it carried with it the responsibility
of a public mission. 3^/ "The mobilization of the Ger-
man economy was symbolized by a ritual which gave the
principal German industrialists semi -military status,
though they wore no uniform. "^2/ In March, 1937, var-
ious leading businessmen in the industrial world were
informed that the Reichsminister for War had ordered
that
a leadership corps for military economy be set
up immediately. The war economy leaders /Wehr-
wirtschaftsfuhrer/ shall be responsible collab-
orators of the Wehrmacht inpreparing and carry-
ing out the mobilization of the armament indus-
try and in the conduct of war. Their signifi-
cance, their tasks, and duties in connection
with armament economy places them in a posi-
tion corresponding approximately to that of re-
serve officers on active duty.±L/
The authority and functions of the Wehrwirtschafts-
ftthrer were outlined by the Wehrwirtschaftsstab of
the Wehrmacht just as if they were an integral part
of the military forces.^/ Shortly after the an-
nouncement of the Four Year Plan Hermann GiJring called
on the manufacturers to forget their profits in the
interests of self-sufficiency. 42/ The Commerce De-
partment decreed that it was the responsibility of
the merchants of Germany to convince the consumers
that they should buy only goods which were produced
in plenty in Germany, avoid allscarce materials, and
guide them away from articles useful for export to
those unsuitable for that purpose. The merchant was
expected to advise and guide the customers in such
a way that tensions were avoided when the goods the
customer desired were not available. 50/
96
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 11
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956
WEHRWIRTSCHAFT: AN ASPECT OF NAZI ECONOMIC THEORY
97
In an address before the leaders of the economy
at the end of 1936, Gftring told them that since the
economy was dependent on the politics, the methods
of economy were also dependent on the methods of pol-
itics. He pronounced it as inconceivable that in a
National Socialist State a capitalistic system of
economy should exist.51/ "Against this conception
of liberalism and economics we set our conception of
national socialism and that is: In the centre of
economy stand the people and the nation, not the in-
dividual and his profit; work and economy are exclu-
sively only there for the whole people. "22/ Accord-
ing to GOring prior to the rise of the Nazis the prob-
lems of production had been left to the "so-called
free play of economic forces, and the state limited
itself to just sitting in judgment on the results."
2A/ By leaving such questions to industry the state
helped destroy the economy. This he labeled as a
sterile policy unsuited to the National Socialists,
who believed in "grabbing difficulties out by the
roots. "54/
In our Four Year Plan the increasing of agri-
cultural and industrial production takes first
place, and the state will press this forward
by every means ;not in such a fashion that the
state itself is in charge, but in such a man-
ner as willassure the state absolute lead-
ership and control where necessary, without
waiting for economic laws to take effect by
themselves. The state does not limit itself to
just administering economic problems where in-
dustry does not itself put the matter in order,
but it willpursue a leading policy according
to plan throughout the whole Reich. 5^/
Go*ring was always most insistent that he wished
nothing to do with socialization, 22/ but he made it
clear that "during the coming years, the Four Year
97
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Plan willgovern the whole of Germany's social and
economic life."12/
The manner in which GOring planned to rule the
economic life of Germany followed none of the estab-
lished patterns in theory. "We do not recognize the
sanctity of some of these so-called economic laws.
Itmust be pointed out that trade and industry are
servants of the people, while capital also has a role
to play as the servant of economy. "22/ The placing
of government contracts with industry did not mean
that all the advantage was with the entrepreneur.
The control of business and industry in Ger-
many. . .has only succeeded in curtailing the
powers of the individual manufacturer to such
an extent that today he suffers from all the
disadvantages which State interference neces-
sitates while he enjoys none of the advantages
which State interference may offer. He carries
all the risks which private enterprise neces-
sarily has to take, while he is not free to
employ his private capital where reasonable
profits seem to him assured. 12/
By 1938 the Four Year Plan had swallowed up even
the Ministryof Economics and the economy was placed
completely under military command. Active army of-
ficers were placed in the Ministry of Economics to
issue orders that were finally carried out by the
military-economic leaders appointed in the various
industries and sworn in.to Hitler in much the same
way as the military. £2/ The German economy was no
longer either an extension of aggressive capitalism
or a true form of socialism. Few theorists believed
that such an economic system could be reconciled with
a competitive economy which rested on individual en-
terprise. 2i/ Even these admitted that in reality in-
dividual entrepreneurs had become mere agents of the
government with strictly limited powers. H=/ Through
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the administrative machinery of the Four Year Plan,
the economic philosophy of uehrwirtschaft how domi-
nated every aspect of German life.
FOOTNOTES
1/ Albert T. Lauterbach, Modern War: Its Economic
and Social Aspects , A Bibliography (Princeton:
Institute for Advanced Study, n.d.) has a sec-
tion on Germany. His Economics in Uniform;
MilitaryEconomy and Social Structure (Prince-
ton University Press, 1943) has a more up-to-
date bibliography.2/ Hugo Richarz, Wehrhafte Wirtschaft (Hamburg:
Hanseatiscne, 1938), pp. 7-8', Heinrich Hunke,
Grtlndztlge der Deutschen Volks und V/ehrwirts-
chaft (Berlin: Hunde, 1943), pp. 94-99.2/ "Lie Begriffe der Wehr-, Friedens-, und Kriegs-
wirt-schaft," Mlit&rwissenschaftliche Rund-
schau 2. Heft, 1936, pp. 248 ff. for Wehrwirt-
schaft terminology; W. Volwassen, "Die neuen
Aufgaben der Wirtschaftspolitik," Finanzarchiv
n. F., Band 5, Heft 1, 1938, pp. 27-50, for a
discussion of the old and new orders.y See for example a chapter entitled "Englische
Wehrwirtschaft der Gegenwart, " Karl R&mermann,
Lie Industrielle Kreigswirtschaft Bnglands 1914
- 1918 (Hamburg: Hanseatische, 1935), pp. 72-
80; P. Osthold and R. Uagenftthr, Roosevelt zwi-
schen Spekulation und iJirklichkeit: Grundla^en
und i-lethoden der angloamerikanischen RUistungs-
gemeinschaft (Berlin: I4ittler t 1943): p. 40;
Paul Einzig, Economic 1/arfare (London: Macmil-
lan, 1940), p. 112.i/ Hugo Richarz. Og. cit.pp. 76-7 discusses the var-
ious points of view and cites the chief propo-
nents of each. Eberhard Scherbening, Wirt-
schaftsorganisation im Kriege; mit einer Uber-
sicht uber vorbereitende Massnahmen im Ausland
99
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 11
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol9/iss1/11
ARKANSAS ACADEMY OF SCIENCE
100
(Jena: 1938), pp. 84-91 is a good example.6/ G. Hesse, Die Neue Wirtschaft (Hannover: Mayer,
1944), pp. 114-16 enumerates ten measures under
Wehrwirtschaft ¦which transfer the peace economy
to war.2/ Hugo Richarz. Oj). cit. pp. 7-8; Major Beutler,
"Wesen, Aufgabe, und Begriffe der Wehrwirts-
chaft, 11 Militarwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 2.
Heft, 2. Jahrgang (M&rz, 1937), S. 247. This
periodical is published by the Reichskriemin-
isterium.
8/ Albert Lauterbach. 0£. cit. pp. 78-79; Andre'
Piatier, L'3conomie de Guerre; Collection
D'Etudes Economiques Sous la Direction de Louis
Baudin VIII(Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit
et de Jurisprudence, 1939), pp. 39-50 for an
excellent discussion of VJehrwirtschaf t, defi-
nitions, the controversy, characteristics and
extent of penetration in Germany.2/ Otto Korfes, Der Grunds&tze Vfehrwirtschaftslehre
Hamburg: Hanseatische, 1936), p. 22.
w Hugo Richarz. Og. cit. pp. 7-8.11/ Heinrich Hunke. Ojd. cit. p. 94.12/ Ibid. pp. 94-99.12/ Horst von Metzsch, Der einzige Schutz gegen die
Niederlage; Eine Fiihlungnahme mit Clausewitz
(Breslau: Hirt, 1937), p. 48.
±2/ Kurt Hesse, Per Ifriegswirtschaftliche Gedanke
(Hamburg: Hanseatische, 1935), pp. 49-50; Gott-
hold IYMlhlner, Bevttlkerungsentwicklung unter
Kriegswirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten (Ham-
I burg: Hanseatische, 1935), p. 44-i|A iyiajor Beutler. 0p_. cit. p. 247.
=2/ Kurt Hesse. Od. cit. r>. 50. See also Adolf Lampe.rt esse. 0^ it. p. 50. See als lf Lampe,
Allgemeine Nehrwirtschaftslehre (Jena, Fischer,
1938), p. 2.12/ Hauptmann L6hr, "Die Bedeutung der Industriellen
Mobilmachung," Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresbe-
richte (Hamburg: 1936), p. 38.
100
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 11
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956
loHRWIRTSCHAFT: AN ASPECT OF NAZI ECONOMIC THEORY
101
W Otto Korfes, "Grundsatze cer Wehrwirtschafts-
lehre," i4ilitarwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 2.
Heft, 1938, p7 97.12/ The Times, Nov. 20, 1939; Henry \<L Spiegel, The
Economics of Total Uar (New York: Appleton-
Century, 1942), p. 42.
£xJ The odor Sonnemann, Lie Wirtschaft a Is Kriegs-
waffe (Berlin: LUnnhaupt, 1943), p. 271.i=i/ Hugo Richarz. Qq. cit. pp. 7-8.22/ Theodor Sonnemann. Op. cit. p. 271
Ojd
0£.
Hugo Richarz. Ojd. cit. p. 47.
Albert Lauterbach. 0£. cit. p. 36.
Hugo Richarz. OR. cit. p. 79
23/
24/
Herbert Backe, Las ijnde des Liberalismus in der
VJirtschaft Berlin: Reichsn&hrsfund, 1938), pp.
67-73. In July, 1936, the Leutsche Volkswirts-
chaft, p. 682 published an article complaining
that a number of authors writing about Wehrwirts-
chaft were still thinking in liberal terms and
recommended a list of books for their edifica-
tion which would develop the proper historical
background for them.27/ Ibid, pp. 67-73; Volwassen, "Lie neuen Aufgaben
der llirtschaftspolitik," pp. 33-41.28/ Gustav Stolper, German Economy, 1870-1940 (New
York: Reynal, 1940), p. 96.22/ Hugo Richarz. 0£. cit. p. 32.30/ ibid, p. 32.31/ Kai Sheig Chen, Uehrwirtschaft Aufgaben (Leipzig:
Goldmann, 1938), p. 30.
IS/ "Operatives undi/irtschaftliches Denken." Kriees-" peratives tli es , g
wirtschaftliche Jahresberichte , 1936, p. 14.22/ Georg Thomas, "Aufgabe der Uehrwirtschaft," Lie
U'ehrmacht, Band 3. Heft 10. May10, 1939, p. 20.24/ Otto Korfes. 0p_. cit. pp. 10-19,
2Jy Alexander GiJrner, Leutsche uriegswirtschaft 1914
und 1939 (Berlin: Leutsche, n.d.), p. 19.
Danielcik, Leutschlands Selbstversorgting « p.27;L , j
Georg Thomas. 0p_. cit. p. 20.
UNIVERSITY OF A
101
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 11
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol9/iss1/11
ARKANSAS ACADiiM" OF SCIENCE
102
32/ Heinrich Hunke. Og. cit. p. 98.38/ See such works as Quincy Howe, England Expects
Every American to Lo His Duty (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1937), pp. 135-139; Wallace B.
Lonham, "National Ideals and International
Idols," Harvard Business Review, 11 (1933), p.
389; Stuart Chase, "Autarchy — Is Itthe Eco-
nomic Road of the Future?" Scribner's Magazine,
94 (1933), p. 145; John Maynard Keynes, "National
Self-Sufficiency," Yale Review, XXXVI (Summer,
1933), pp. 45-54.
'
39/ (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. 497.40/ See, e.g., Gottfried Feder, Wirtschaftsftlhrung
im dritten Reich (Berlin: Stalling, 1934), p.
30; Volkswirtschaft, Band 4. Heft 35. 1935, p.
1112.
a—A Germanicus, Germany: The Last Four Years, p. 35 ?
==7 V^lkischer Beobachter, Sept. 10, 1936.
=b2/ Reichsministerium des Innern, Reichs^esetzblatt ,eichsgesetzblatt
1936, Teil 1, p. 887.44/ Norbert i'Mhlen, Per Zauberer Leben und Anleihen
des Lr. H.jalmar Horace Greeley Schacht (Zurich:
Europa, 1938), p. 33; Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct.
31, 1937; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, The Struc-
ture and Practice of National Socialism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 301.45/ Albert Lauterbach. 0£. cit. p. 79.46/ Military Tribunal No. IV, Case No. 6, p. 49. Man-
uscript in hands of Frank Murdock, Berkeley,
California.
42/ Ibid, p. 49.!£/ Ibid. pp. 47, 49.
baJ Per Vier.jahresplan, Jan., 1937, p. 3150/ ibid. June, 1937, p. 334.I
Ibid. Aug., 1937, p. 453.a/52/ Hermann G&ring, Political Testament of Hermann
Gdring; A Selection of Important Speeches and
Articles, trans. H.W.Blood-Ryan (London: Long,
1939), p. 234.
102
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 11
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956
WEHRWIRTSCHAFT: AN ASPECT OF NAZI ECONOMIC THEORY
103
£2/ Ibid, p. 214.54/ Ibid, p. 214.
55/ Ibid, p. 214.
56/ Per Vier.jahresplan, Jan., 1939, p. 2.
57/ Hermann Gflring. 0£. cit. p. 210.
58/ Ibid, p. 211.59/ Germanicus, pseud., Germany: The Last Four Years;
an Independent Examination of the Results of
National Socialism (New York: Houghton Mifflin,
,
n/ 1937), PP. 29-30.2ii/ This change may best be followed in the issues
of GOring 's periodical Ler Vier.jahresplan from
its maiden issue in January 1937 until the out-
.
, break of the war.
£1/ Albert Lauterbach, Ojd. cit, p. 79.62/ Lampe, Allgemeine liehrwirtschaf tslehre ,pp. 11-
13; Josef l.:inschuh, Gerlistete IJirtschaft Ber-
lin: Frundsberg, 1940), p. 7, pp. 28-29.
103
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 11
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol9/iss1/11
